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Abstract
Outsourcing is a valuable strategy for firms to gain more benefits from the 
global supply chain. Outsourcing can be defined as a business agreement in which 
a firm is contracting out certain existing parts of the firm to either domestic and/
or international third parties. In this chapter, we give an overview to the benefits 
and disadvantages of outsourcing. We also discuss recent trends in outsourcing; in 
particular, with the benefit of technology development, robots are starting to join in 
outsourcing.
Keywords: outsourcing and offshoring, pros and cons, industry trends,  
past experience, future outlook
1. Introduction
Outsourcing is one of the current mainstream business strategies for firms to 
earn more benefits from the global supply chain [1]. According to [2], the U.S. 
outsourcing industry’s revenue grew over 20 billion U.S. dollars from 2010 to 2019. 
Moreover, globally, the total outsourcing industry revenue increased from 93.1 
billion U.S. dollars to 135.5 billion U.S. dollars.
With the blooming of outsourcing, academic researchers conducted studies 
to better understand the many aspects of outsourcing. To date, Google Scholar 
has listed approximately 390,000 articles related to the keyword “outsourcing” 
published since 2010. Although the researchers’ interests in outsourcing varied, 
in recent years many researchers were focusing on outsourcing with Information 
Technologies [3–5], Logistics [6–8], and Education [9–11]. Researchers are particu-
larly interested in outsourcing with Information Technologies [5, 12], including 
issues related to cloud computing [13–16] and security [13–15, 17, 18].
In the rest of this chapter, we will first give an overview of the historical back-
ground of the development of outsourcing, and the definition of outsourcing. We 
will then discuss benefits of outsourcing, including lowering cost, improving the 
focus on core competencies, receiving the best technology within the industry 
which the firms did not have, and increasing the employees’ flexibility. We will also 
discuss the risks or potential disadvantages of outsourcing. We will also discuss 
recent trends in outsourcing, focusing on the impact of new technologies including 




Outsourcing could trace back to Rome for tax collection [19]. However, the 
concept of outsourcing was first proposed by Adam Smith in his book The Wealth 
of Nations [20]. This book posited that division of labor and specialization of labor 
are the key factors for productivity optimization. Smith argued that labor special-
ization promotes individual productivity and helps groups of employees cooperate 
with each other.
In the 1830s, innovations on railway networks and telegraph reduced the 
exchange time of both information and products. The development of the manu-
facturing industry allowed firms to enjoy the benefits from economics of scale and 
expand their business areas [21].
Later, in the post-war period, companies were advocated to conduct horizontal 
acquisition and vertical acquisition. At that time, proposers believed that conglom-
erate mergers’ strategy could help businesses earn better control over both produc-
tion and market share [22].
However, between the 1970s and 1980s, academics continued to discover that the 
conglomerate firms were under-performing in the market [23–25].
Then in 1985, Williamson [26] proposed a new concept called Asset Specificity. 
Williamson illustrated that in order to optimize the company, the company needs 
to consider both production cost and transaction cost. Williamson identified the 
differences between these two costs as a function of asset specificity. In addition, 
Williamson’s Transaction Cost Theory [27] presumed that the most advantageous 
economic organizational structure is the one that was minimizing the transaction 
cost while maximizing the profit. Williamson defined Transaction Cost as the cost 
which summarized all the cost to make a transaction except production cost.
Williamson [26] proposed that economic institutions contained two charac-
teristics - bounded rationality and opportunism. While in the exclusive contract 
situation, asset specificity would be added as a significant factor. When a circum-
stance consists of all three elements, the economic institutions will coordinate 
transactions to save limited rationality while protecting both sides from oppor-
tunism attacks. This concept was distinct from the traditional concept of profit 
maximization.
The concept of Asset Specificity helped explain the phenomenon of conglom-
erate firms under-performing in the market when they should be bringing great 
advantages to the business [28]. A Conglomerate merger is two or more economic 
institutions construct an exclusive contract with each other. Compared to the 
privately held company, the main concept of conglomerate firms already from 
profit maximization shift to coordinate transactions. Even though the conglomerate 
merger will reduce the company’s production cost, the transaction cost will increase 
since the company’s size is increasing.
Despite Williamson’s significant effort on enlightening outsourcing by transac-
tion cost theory, according to [22], Tom Peter was the one who significantly influ-
enced the companies back to concentrate on the firm’s core business.
Many firms were inspired by the Core Competency concept [29]. Core compe-
tency is a unique value that makes a firm stand out in the marketplace by utilizing 
its available resources and knowledge. However, the firms based on this concept to 
reengineering to more focus on the “core” [22].
Meanwhile, the public sector’s outsourcing is helping economic institutions 
to strengthen the idea of Outsourcing. Between the 1980s to 1990s, notably in the 
U.K., governments are using privatization and outsourcing to reform the public 
sector. The public sector’s reform set an example for firms about the strengths of 
Outsourcing. The reform also promoted the development of outsourcing in both 
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the public and private sectors. The U.K. example influenced numerous firms to start 
to restructure their organizational framework to outsource unnecessary tasks and 
focus on the core activities [22].
3. Definition of outsourcing
As discussed above, outsourcing as a practical strategic tool has appeared for a 
long time; however, the official definition did not exist until 1997 [30].
The academics had been arguing about the definition since 1992. However, the 
broad definition of outsourcing is that it obtains activities that an organization has 
the knowledge and resources to execute, from outside of the organization [31].
Recently, Ishizaka et al. [1] examined the existing literature from 1994 to 2020 
and came to a comprehensive conclusion:
“Outsourcing is a business agreement, either domestic and/or international 
(known as offshoring), and strategic management initiative for gaining a competi-
tive advantage of a firm by contracting out their existing internal and/or external 
non-value added functions, and/or value-added functions, and/or core competen-
cies to competent supplier(s) to produce products and/or services efficiently and 
effectively for the outsourcing firm.” ([1], p. 1, para 4).
Ishizaka et al.’s [1] definition contained multiple elements, including multiple 
branches and sub-branches. First overall and the most fundamental, Outsourcing 
is a business agreement. It indicates that demander and supplier reach a consensus 
through either oral or written agreement.
Outsourcing is a strategic management initiative that uses a contract-out the 
firm’s either existing functions and/or core competencies to earn the opportunity to 
stand out in the market. This indicated that companies could outsource not only the 
functions but also the core competencies to the third parties.
Last but not least, outsourcing can be a strategic management initiative by con-
tracting out to qualified supplier(s) to efficiently and effectively produce products 
and/or services for the outsourcing firm to stand out in the market. This statement 
is to clarify that outsourcing does not need to be limited to products or services. A 
company can outsource their business process regardless of whether they provide 
either physical goods, non-physical goods, or both as long as this contract-out 
behavior can help the firm optimize productivity and quality.
With such a complex nature of outsourcing, Alexandre Dolgui and Jean-Marie 
Proth [32] provided some additional information to help clarify Outsourcing. 
Dolgui and Proth found that the frequent confusions for outsourcing are to separate 
outsourcing, offshore outsourcing, offshoring, and subcontracting.
The differences between outsourcing and offshore outsourcing are related to 
the location of the supplier and the outsourcing firm. Outsourcing commonly 
identified as both supplier and the firm both located in the same country. However, 
offshore outsourcing defined as the supplier is located in a country different than 
the firm. On top of that, offshore is classified as the firm constructed a branch in a 
different country.
According to Dolgui and Proth, practitioners such as managers were more likely 
to confuse the concept of outsourcing with sub-contracting. Sub-contracting is the 
firm contract-out partial works to another firm that contain specific resources and/
or skills to provide better task results. Outsourcing, on the other hand, is the firm 
contract-out partial works to the supplier to allow the supplier to collaborate with 
the outsourcing firm.
In other words, sub-contracting only provides product and/or services that are 
specified in the contract; meanwhile, outsourcing is defined as the outsourcing firm 
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establishing a partnership with the supplier. Dolgui and Proth pointed out that out-
sourcing requires some level of technical and organizational information exchange.
4. Motivation of outsourcing
Lacity et al. provided a systematic analysis of the motivations of outsourcing 
[33–35]. They categorized outsourcing into business process outsourcing and 
information technology outsourcing [33, 34]. Business process outsourcing is 
contract-out the business process to the entity outside of the company. Information 
technology outsourcing is contract-out the information technology services to 
the entity outside of the company. Lacity et al. [35] explained with more details 
when merging the two as business services outsourcing. The types of outsourcing 
“include, but not limited to, financial and accounting, human resources, procure-
ment, R&D, call centers/customer service, software development, software sup-
port, infrastructure management services, systems integration services, and legal 
service.”
Lacity et al. [33–35] analyzed over 400 empirical studies from 1992 to 2014. 
They discovered 19 independent variables frequently shown up crossing six fac-
tors [35]. They found that the outsourcing firm had multiple motives to make the 
outsourcing decision other than just cost-saving. Lacity et al. pointed out that the 
firm tends to make an outsourcing decision when the firm craves on optimizing 
the quality and flexibility of the services while the firm wants to have a supplier’s 
professional skills and global markets in order to focus on the critical services. In 
other words, the outsourcing firm is looking to use the minimum cost to get the 
best results and tends to focus on the “core” of the company. However, the firm also 
considers losing control as a negative effect. This factor will make the firm prefer to 
make a decision against outsourcing.
In addition to the reasons above, Lacity et al. [35] also found that the outsourc-
ing firm also frequently consider transaction attributes (such as high transaction 
costs, difficulty formalizing knowledge, high service complexity, and lack of service 
standards). The outsourcing firm will be more confident when the outsourcing firm 
possesses a certain level of technical and methodological capabilities. One interest-
ing point is, when the nature of the firm is high degrees of internationalization, the 
firm more prefers outsourcing and offshoring.
Building on [33–35], Asatiani et al. [36] ran a regression based on a rich data set 
of 337 companies. They found that the motivation of outsourcing seems to be more 
dynamic than linear. They point out that even though cost-saving and focus on the 
“core” is positively correlated with outsourcing, the need for external expertise is a 
negative factor.
5. Risks of outsourcing
With all the advantages that outsourcing brings along, there are some risks of 
outsourcing that require the manager to notice before and after making the out-
sourcing decision.
5.1 Types of risks
Aron et al. [37] proposed that outsourcing risks can be divided into four catego-
ries: strategic risks, operational risks, intrinsic risks of atrophy, and intrinsic risks 
of location. Strategic risks referred to the risks related to opportunistic behavior for 
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both the outsourcing firm and the supplier. The agent problem always comes with 
the same two reasons: the supplier did not work as hard as the outsourcing firm 
expected. The outsourcing firm manager cannot be aware of the manager hiring 
unqualified supplier due to lack of information or resources [37].
Information Leakage issues can happen to the supplier either unintention-
ally or intentionally. The supplier can either purposely steal the information the 
outsourcing firm provided and developed as supplier’s new advantages or leak the 
information to the third parties accidentally due to the supplier’s imperfect system 
structure.
Opportunistic renegotiation can be triggered when the supplier realizes that 
the outsourcing firm heavily relies on their products or services and there are no 
better solutions in the existing market. In that scenario, the supplier will push the 
outsourcing firm to renegotiate the distribution of benefits to ensure the supplier’s 
profit maximization.
Operational risks referred to the risks of communication and coopera-
tion between the outsourcing firm and supplier in the period of outsourcing. 
Operational risks can happen in many circumstances, such as complexity of opera-
tions, geographic location differences between the supplier and the outsourcing 
firm, and the communication barriers and transmit systems between the supplier 
and the outsourcing firm. Benefit from the information technology rapidly devel-
oping, the operational risks keep decreasing. However, lowering the operational 
risks required to transform massive information outside of the outsourcing firm 
will significantly increase information leakage’s strategic risk [37].
Intrinsic risks of atrophy referred to after the outsourcing decision was made, 
the outsourcing firm will lose the professional whose expertise in the outsourcing 
activities. Depending on the outsourcing firm’s strategy is focusing on cost-saving 
or maintain the company’s control, this issue can be big or small. It also can interact 
with the strategic risk of opportunistic renegotiation. When the supplier posse a 
renegotiation request, if the outsourcing firm still maintains the professions with 
such expertise, it increases its bargaining power.
Intrinsic risks of location referred to the risk of outsourcing the firm to a remote 
location. The location risks can be but are not limited to geopolitical risks, sovereign 
risks, and exchange rate risks. This type of risk ties to the specific of outsourcing 
location; each region had its own unique cultural and political background. Without 
the manager understanding the supplier’s country in advance, it can increase the 
possibility that the outsourcing firm must take the extra cost from not familiar with 
the supplier’s country. This type of risk often happens when a manager makes an 
offshore outsourcing decision.
Overall, the types of risks summarized the possible directions a firm can meet 
the obstacles and lead to an outsourcing decision’s failure. Next, this chapter would 
like to introduce the risk of outsourcing based on outsourcing processes to under-
stand outsourcing risks further.
5.2 Business process risk
Shi [38] posed that business process outsourcing usually contains two types 
of risks: market performance risks and organizational risks. Based on the time of 
outsourcing, Shi divided the risks further into four types. However, within market 
performance risks when the firm just outsourcing, the balancing cost and out-
sourcing results and increase customer complaints are tie back to agent problem. 
Meanwhile, operation shut-down is the side effect of intrinsic risks of atrophy. 
After time passes, Shi mentioned the risk could become the price or contract creep 
and low innovation rate. For the change of the price or contract, it can tie back to 
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the opportunistic renegotiation. As a result of operation shut-down, the firm will 
have a low rate of innovation due to the profession’s loss within such expertise. This 
risk can refer back to intrinsic risks of atrophy.
For organizational risks, when the firm just outsourcing, the firm will experi-
ence losing the specific knowledge that the firm outsourcing to the supplier, loss of 
confidential information, loss of employees whose contained loyalty and capability 
and lower the existing employee’s morale and productivity. The loss of specific 
knowledge, loss of employee, and lower existing employee’s morale is the side effect 
of the operation shut-down. However, this type of risk tie to the intrinsic risks of 
atrophy, which more rely on the manager’s decision on cost-saving or preserve the 
bargaining power. On the other hand, loss of confidential information is the risk of 
transferring to a new system which indicated this risk tie to information leakage. 
The risk of lower employee productivity can interpret from two aspects. One of 
the risk is that the employee’s productivity is lower due to the working process has 
changed due to the firm’s recent outsourcing decision. The employees require extra 
time to adapt to the new methods of doing their old job. The other interpretation is 
due to the operation shut-down, the resignation wave within the firm, and the low 
morale among employees, the existing employee became low productive. Lower 
employee productivity risk can refer back to intrinsic risks of atrophy since all of 
them are the side effect of operation shut-down.
After the firm adapted to outsourcing, the firm can have organizational risks 
such as relying on the supplier, losing control of strategic assets, locking in between 
the outsourcing firm and supplier, adapting to the incompatible architectural style, 
and unsuitable competitive signaling, Loss of innovation capabilities and strategic 
flexibility.
Among all the risks above, the incompatible architectural style and unsuitable 
competitive signaling can tie to both the agent problem and operational risks. The 
incompatible architectural style indicated that the firm partially sacrifices its oper-
ating mode to fit the style supplier provided to cooperate better. And unsuitable 
competitive signaling indicated the firm permitted some of the non-value-added 
terms to earn the opportunity to work with the supplier or make the outsourcing 
process run smoother at the beginning of the outsourcing. However, when time 
passes by, the existing terms lost their advantages. These two risks can happen cause 
of the firm lack of necessary information to discover a suitable supplier or in the 
existing market, there is no existing supplier that can perfectly fit the outsourcing 
firm’s requirement. Therefore, they can tie to both agent problem and opera-
tional risks.
As for the lock-in, loss control on strategic assets, loss of innovation capabilities 
and strategic flexibility, and reliance on the supplier, they all can tie to intrinsic 
risks of atrophy. Lock-in is due to asset specificity. When the outsourcing firm and 
supplier made a contract, the outsourcing firm and the supplier are naturally locked 
in. Cause of the characteristics of lock-in and the how much the outsourcing firm 
is sacrificing to reach an agreement, the outsourcing firm will lose some level of 
strategic flexibility or control on strategic assets. Furthermore, on a cost-saving 
basis, the operation shut-down decision is made, the risks of innovation capabilities 
loss and reliance on the supplier will exist due to the talent loss. But after all, these 
risks all relate to the nature of outsourcing and the firm’s decision of cost-saving. 
Therefore, they all refer to intrinsic risks of atrophy.
5.3 Information technology risk
Aubert et al. [39] in total list seven undesirable outcomes: unexpected transition 
and management cost, switching cost, expensive contractual amendments, disputes 
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and litigation, service degradation, increased cost, organizational competencies 
loss, and hidden service cost.
Unexpected transition and management costs are attributed to three risk factors: 
either the outsourcing firm and/or the supplier’s lack of knowledge on the outsourc-
ing, the supplier unfamiliar with the outsourcing firm, and unfamiliar with the 
legal environment.
Both outsourcing firm and the supplier can increase the transition and man-
agement cost when either of them is unfamiliar with the outsourcing process. 
Furthermore, this situation increases the overall cost for the outsourcing firm to 
get their expected results. The reason behind that is the outsourcing firm’s lack of 
knowledge of either the outsourcing process or awareness on the supplier’s qualifi-
cation. Therefore, either the outsourcing firm or the supplier’s lack of experience in 
the outsourcing process is the agent problem. Meanwhile, when the supplier is unfa-
miliar with the outsourcing firm, the firm needs to train the supplier the same as 
the new employees. The extra training requires the firm to pay the additional cost to 
smooth the outsourcing process. These risks only exist when the firm needs to adapt 
the services or unfamiliar system which the supplier provided. It can be identified 
as operational risks. Also, unfamiliar with the legal environment can be classified 
as intrinsic risk of location because the legal system gets involved. If the supplier 
and the outsourcing firm are located in the same region, the supplier should share 
the same legal system with the outsourcing firm. Then less likely, both sides need to 
experience the risk of an unfamiliar legal environment unless one of them or both 
of them are new to outsourcing. Hence, unexpected transition and management 
cost and its risk factors can be identified as Agent Problem, Operational Risks, and 
Intrinsic Risk of Location.
Switching cost as an undesirable outcome contained lock-in, repatriation, and 
transfer to another supplier. Switching cost is the cost the outsourcing firm needs 
to consider when the firm needs to consider replacing the supplier or not. Asset 
specificity, a small number of suppliers, economic scope, and interdependence of 
activities are the risk factors associated with switching costs. Asset specificity is 
the characteristic of a contract; the number of suppliers and the economic scope 
decided the outsourcing firm’s interdependency level. All the risk factors related 
to switching cost can be identified as opportunistic renegotiation and intrinsic 
risks of atrophy. After all, all the risk factors related to switching cost depend on 
how unique the supplier’s resource or knowledge—the more unique, the higher the 
switching cost. The uniqueness provided the supplier the power to renegotiate and 
influence the outsourcing firm’s decision-making on withholding specific profes-
sions to remain bargaining power to the supplier.
Expensive contractual amendment is the cost of adjusting the contract caused 
by uncertainty, technological discontinuity, and task complexity. Uncertainty 
indicated that the supplier’s performance could not be measured will be forced both 
sides to adjust the existing contract to confirm shift the invalid performance mea-
surement to the new performance measurement. Invalid performance measurement 
can happen when either task is too complex or the supplier cannot provide a good 
performance for the outsourcing firm. The task complexity will discuss shortly. 
This suggested uncertainty is both agent problem and opportunistic renegotiation. 
When no supplier in the existing market provides a discontinued technology, the 
outsourcing firm is forced to renew the contract with the supplier to accept the 
substitute solutions. Task complexity related to the uncertainty of the future needs, 
Aubert et al. [39] posed that when the task is too complex when changes appear, 
both sides are forced to renegotiate the contract. In general, expensive contractual 
amendments and their related risk factors are classified as opportunistic renegotia-
tion mainly and attached the agent problem.
Outsourcing and Offshoring
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Disputes and litigation as the undesirable outcomes mainly indicate the issues 
created by contracts, agreements, and legal environments. Measurement Issues, 
Lack of knowledge in outsourcing contracts from either the supplier or the out-
sourcing firm, unfamiliar with the legal environment, and poor cultural fit are 
the risk factors for disputes and litigation. As mentioned earlier, the measurement 
issue is the opportunistic renegotiation and agent problem, lack of knowledge in 
outsourcing contracts from either the supplier or the outsourcing firm is agent 
problem, and unfamiliar with the legal environment is an intrinsic risk of location. 
Poor cultural fit belongs to the intrinsic risk of location. Poor cultural fit originated 
from the cultural differences between the two regions.
Service degradation indicated that the outsourcing company’s service after the 
outsourcing decision is not as good as the firm before outsourcing. Such down-
grade is caused by interdependence of activities, the supplier unfamiliar with the 
outsourcing firm, the size of supplier, supplier’s financial instability, measurement 
issue, and task complexity. As shown before, the interdependence of activities is 
opportunistic renegotiation and intrinsic risks of atrophy, the supplier unfamiliar 
with the outsourcing firm is operational risks, the measurement issue is agent 
problem and opportunistic renegotiation, and task complexity is opportunistic 
renegotiation. Earl [40] argued that the quality of service largely depends on the 
supplier’s size, financial stability, and expertise. Since the size and stability are the 
characteristics of determining is the supplier a qualified supplier or not, the sup-
plier size and supplier’s stability are referred to as agent problem.
The increased cost is related to the risk factors of the supplier’s lack of knowl-
edge with contract management, measurement issue, and the supplier unfamiliar 
with the outsourcing firm. When the supplier performance but both sides could not 
come up with a valid measurement to determine the quality of the supplier’s perfor-
mance, it can be caused by either the outsourcing firm lack of effective monitoring 
methods or the supplier did not provide enough details allow the outsourcing firm 
to inspect the performance quality.
Organizational competencies loss means that due to the outsourcing firm’s 
getting contract-out to the supplier, the outsourcing firm may experience the loss 
of the professions and knowledge related to the outsourced part. Organizational 
competencies loss is connected to the risk of contract scope, close to the core 
competency, and interdependence of activities. Scope of contract means the more 
outsourcing firm contract out to one supplier, the harder the outsourcing firm can 
maintain independence. Meanwhile, when the outsourcing is too close to the “core,” 
the outsourcing activity will cause the outsourcing firm to lose the essential skills 
[29]. Moreover, this kind of loss can have a negative impact on the future of the out-
sourcing firm. Organizational competency loss can be identified as intrinsic risks 
of atrophy since all the risks are shown up after outsourcing behavior happened. 
The talent loss situation from Intrinsic risks of atrophy can lead to opportunistic 
renegotiation due to the outsourcing firm heavily relying on the supplier.
The last undesirable outcome is the hidden service cost. Hidden service cost 
contained three risk factors: task complexity, measurement issue, and uncertainty. 
Agency theory suggested that when the supplier on purposely created measurement 
issues to increase the cost assessment challenge due to low morale, then more than 
likely hidden service cost will increase.
In summary, information technology outsourcing is involved in all four risks. 
Unlike business process outsourcing, Information technology outsourcing tends to 
more frequent to have agent problem, Intrinsic risks of atrophy, and opportunistic 
renegotiation. In other words, the outsourcing firm manager should pay more 
attention to talents lost and its series of consequences. Simultaneously, the manager 
should work harder to identify a qualified supplier to avoid undesirable outcomes.
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As Asatiani et al. [36] mentioned, the outsourcing factors are dynamic. 
Many firms are now contracting-out their parts to multiple suppliers [41, 42]. 
Outsourcing firm can contract multiple parts to multiple suppliers. To increase the 
firm’s control, the manager can even split the business process into several pieces 
for different suppliers. Therefore, each outsourcing firm will experience its unique 
challenges since they had its unique combination of outsourcing.
5.4 Risk management assessment
Existing literature tends to study the outsourcing risk as to the risk management 
cases instead of developing a measurement tool [43–45]. In addition, many studies 
only study the Risk Assessment in Information Technology Outsourcing [46–48].
When Aron et al. [37] posed the outsourcing risks into four categories, they 
also proposed a task decomposition of the process that the bank requested. This 
process had three steps: identification, formulation of retention strategy, and 
retention. Aron et al. adjusted this method to fit for outsourcing risk assessment. 
Identification is based on the four risk categories to identify an outsourcing 
firm’s risks. The next step, the formulation of retention strategy, is managers and 
researchers propose multiple solutions to determine the best solution for the situa-
tion based on the risks. The last step is retention. This step is to execute the solution 
determined in the second step. For more details, see [37].
Welborn [49] also proposed using a specific assessment tool to help managers 
and researchers to identified outsourcing risks. Welborn suggested using Failure 
Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) to identify outsourcing risk since FMEA is used for 
risk management. FMEA was evolved from Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA). FMECA was proposed in [50]. It is a traditional criticality 
analysis assessment tool to identify item failure. FMEA become a popular tool for 
many industries used to conduct safety and reliability analysis related to systems, 
products, processes, and services [51].
FMEA suggested that users identified risk categories and then detail specific 
potential risks. After that, based on severity, frequency of occurrence, and detect-
ability, to score each risk and calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN) by multiple 
all three aspects’ scores. They are then using a pareto distribution to analyze the 
RPN of each risk and develop a solution against the high RPN. FMEA is an assess-
ment tool that is able to execute when the process occurs changes repeatedly [51].
Lee et al. [42] take advantage of FMEA’s universally suitable features, they used 
the adjusted the FMEA framework Supply Chain Risk-Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (SCR-FMEA, [52]) and combined it with Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) 
to conduct a risk assessment tool which contains both qualitative and quantitative 
risk assessment.
6. Trends and discussion
6.1 Trends in the academia
Lacity et al. [35] found that there still many mysteries to be revealed. To better 
understand the motivation of outsourcing, Lacity et al. call for more studies related 
to governance determinants since there are limited studies on such areas. Lacity 
et al. [35] encouraged researchers to extend their interest to relate outsourcing 
with innovation, disclosed more about environmental factors’ relationship with 
outsourcing, and understand more about the outsourcing firm’s capabilities and 
the supplier. Lacity et al. suggested exploring more on outsourcing configurational 
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methods, discovering new pricing models other than fixed-price model and time & 
materials model, understanding better on business analytics sourcing, and reveal-
ing emerging models. They discuss how outsourcing and its related personnel posi-
tively influence marginalized populations and their roles in sustaining the planet. 
The other future directions are discussed in advisors, the threat of cybersecurity, 
and the influence of service automation.
In addition, [53] point out that many researchers are aware of lacking longitu-
dinal datasets, and they encouraged researchers to conduct longitudinal studies to 
help understand outsourcing. Another suggestion provided by [53] is to extend the 
related personnel to the parties responsible for outsourcing and the other stakehold-
ers whose careers are impacted and/or threatened by the outsourcing decision.
6.2 Trends in the practice
Kakabadse and Kakabadse [41] concluded that outsourcing in the 2000s was 
more focused on cost management and functional specialization, and differentia-
tion strategy and market response capability would become of the future. The 
outsourcing cost of data storage, e-commerce, and website setup was drastically 
reduced. Small and Medium-sized enterprises tend to seek contract-out to the third 
party by paying the monthly flat fee. In addition, the outsourcing process is from 
carrying non-core function moving to the core, from a single function extend to a 
complete business process and/or value-added intangible assets. Meanwhile, out-
sourcing firms were shifted from manufacturing to small/medium-sized enterprises 
and public sectors.
Also, the ways of cooperation between the outsourcing firm and the supplier 
became looser. The outsourcing firm tends to change from recruit single suppliers to 
multiple suppliers. Moreover, the outsourcing firm tended to produce a white label 
product to reduce the cost further and maximize the profit. The outsourcing firm 
also intends to construct a joint venture partnership with the supplier to allow the 
supplier to join the decision-making process and bear the cost together. Meanwhile, 
the payment method changed from pre-payment to pay-on-demand.
Due to the rapid development of outsourcing, the company’s concept had 
changed from vertically integrative diversified corporation to the networked 
enterprise specialized corporation that seeks the best variety in the enterprise 
network. Also, the outsourcing firm tends to focus on cost reduction of R&D and 
systems innovation. The supplier tends to just install and run new systems instead 
of takeover the existing assets. Moreover, the outsourcing firm was transferred their 
habit of contract-out the entire complex operation to one supplier to assign multiple 
suppliers based on the professional requirements of each area.
Because of the development of technology, more and more information technol-
ogy outsourcing strategy has discovered. Hanafizadeh and Zareravasan [53], based 
on their review of 91 Information technology outsourcing studies published between 
2000 and 2018 in over 50 journals, summarized that the following seven strategies 
are the mainstream strategy of ITO: cloud computing, IT operations and mainte-
nance outsourcing, information system development outsourcing, BPO, offshore 
outsourcing. The outsourcing firm shows a trend on relying on machine’s computing 
capabilities and using a machine to replace human for repetitive behavior.
6.3 New player in the outsourcing industry
Before we discuss who the new player is in the outsourcing business and the pros 
and cons, let us briefly clarify some of the concepts first. This section will adopt the 
concept of cloud computing, big data analytics, and service automation.
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Cloud computing is a shared computing technology where software and hard-
ware cooperate with the real-time network to provide users a service which allows 
user access certain supplier-provided services or functions remotely. Cloud com-
puting consists of Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [54, 55].
Big data analytics is human adopting advanced analytics techniques on the big 
data set [56].
Service automation is a concept proposed by [57]. Service automation indicated 
the service sector used a machine to provide service instead of a human. Lacity et al. 
[35] referred that service automation as a machine that replaces humans to accom-
plish highly perceptual tasks and highly cognitive tasks. Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
[58] believed that the first machine age existed in industrial revolution. At that 
time, machines replace humans’ manual labor. Furthermore, the second machine 
age is the era in which machines replaced humans for mental work.
Davenport and Ronanki [59] categorized artificial intelligence application in 
business into three categories: process automation, cognitive insight, and cognitive 
engagement.
Process automation is the robot using robotic process automation to automate 
the digital and physical task. The machine simulates humans to input and output 
information from multiple information technology systems. Cognitive Insight is 
the robot using massive user data to predict users’ behavior and preferences based 
on algorithms. This kind of robot is usually used for optimized job performance 
for machines. The tasks that the machine needs to accomplish are too complex for 
humans; therefore, human jobs are unaffected by this type of machine [59].
Cognitive Engagement is the robot use intelligent agents, machine learning 
technology, and natural language processing chatbots to interact with a human.
Cloud computing is a technology that allows customers to access products, 
resources, and/or services remotely by using the software as an interface regardless 
of the hardware setting. Big data analytics is a technology in which humans use 
massive data to explore the unfound facts from data producers using the analytic 
technique. Service automation is a technology using the robot to substitute partial 
mental work. Due to technological development, the robot is joining the outsourc-
ing industry.
Computer and machine bring great advantages for business. They can help the 
firms to optimize their efficiency. Meanwhile, they also contained multiple risks 
and challenges. The following section proposes the possible benefits, challenges, 
and risks of cloud computing and service automation in outsourcing to bring 
researchers and practitioners some thoughts.
6.3.1 The benefits
Mainly Cloud Computing Technology contained three benefits: cost-saving, 
flexibility, and rapidity. One of the main benefits for businesses to select a cloud 
computing service is to reduce their investment budget in IT [60]. The on-demand 
pricing model, on some level, exempts the user’s partial cost to access the service 
and the upfront cost to establish such a service [61]. For example, developing a 
virtual machine algorithm on optimizing resource allocation is the cost that the firm 
might require to pay upfront [62].
Cloud computing outsourcing allows the firm to enjoy flexibility at the level of 
allocating resources. The firm is buying the resource based on real-time demand 
instead of pre-purchased hardware and software. The charming part of such flex-




The firm exploits the characteristics of rapid and flexible cloud computing to 
conduct many strategies and product tests to determine the best solution for the 
company [63]. Moreover, Cloud computing allows the firm to rapidly gather the 
required resources and provide a fundamental infrastructure within a few days [60].
Service automation’s benefit needs to target by each specific technology. Process 
automation is the lowest cost among the three robots and had low user learning cost 
to access this service [59]. Process automation can help the outsourcing firm save 
massive time that the employees spend on repetitive low-level mental tasks. In addi-
tion, it works excellent for multi-system cross-referencing. This indicated that if a 
company shifts service to a different provider when a contract is over, the process 
automation can play the role of a middleman to help smooth the data transfer 
process.
Cognitive insight mainly helps the outsourcing firm optimize machine’s job 
performance, which means this type of robot will not steal human’s job because 
humans are unable to accomplish a job that this type of robot does [59]. Another 
benefit is that since this kind of robot has a cognitive function, it indicated that the 
robot has self-learning and self-optimization functions in understanding users and 
optimizing the quality of future data collection.
Cognitive Engagement mainly simulates human interaction with customers, this 
type of robot’s cognitive function is enhanced in creating a solution for the users 
and simulating human language [59]. The benefit of this kind of robot is freeing 
customer service time from answering a large number of repeated, basic questions.
Davenport and Ronanki [59] found that over half of the company executives 
they interviewed (51%) motivated by service automation can optimize its products. 
In addition, many executives agree that service automation can help optimize inter-
nal business operations (36%), free up employees to conduct a more creative task 
(36%), make a better decision (35%), product innovation (32%), optimize external 
business process (30%), extent the market (25%), access and rational use of scarce 
knowledge (25%), and only close to one-fifth of the executives (22%) mentions on 
use service automation to streamlining the company population. This indicated that 
for most managers, using robots to replace humans is not the primary purpose of 
bringing in the robot to the company.
6.3.2 The challenges
For cloud computing services, challenges and risks exist for both the service 
provider and the users. Alali and Yeh [60] expressed their concern about data 
security risks and the importance of standardization guidance for cloud comput-
ing. For service providers, the security risk is to protect all the data from leakage by 
third parties.
Data breaches are becoming more and more common. Verizon [64] found 3,950 
confirmed data breaches during the period from the beginning of November 2018 
to the end of October 2019.
Verizon found that the most common cause for data breach involved hacking 
(45%), errors (22%), social attacks (22%), malware (17%), misuse by authorized 
users (8%), and physical actions (4%). Meanwhile, most of the breaches conducted 
by the individual outside of the company (70%), over half of them involved 
organized criminal groups (55%), some of them involve inside job (30%), and 
perpetrator involving partner (1%), multiple parties (1%), and an attacker alliance 
which had four or more members in a single breach (4%) are rare to see. Verizon 
found that 72% of the breaches target large companies. Moreover, Verizon empha-
sized that since the business is trending into cloud-based solutions, the use of stolen 
credentials would increase in the future.
13
Outsourcing: Overview and Trends
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.98333
For the service clients, the security risk is to ensure the data storage in the 
outsourced company did not leak to the supplier company (service provider) and/or 
the unrelated third parties [60]. Cannon [65] also suggested that the cloud comput-
ing designer should focus more on optimizing data privacy protection.
Of course, the proposals above are not groundless. Verizon’s report showed that 
over half of the victims (58%) from the data breaches experience personal data 
leakage. This indicated that the outsourced company’s information gets leakage, 
and outsourced firm’s customers will also be affected. For example, Adobe in 2013 
got a data breach that impacted at least 38 million of their customers. The hacker 
stole 3 million credit card records and login information from Adobe’s users. On this 
basis, tens of millions of user accounts may have been compromised. Even there 
are risks for the cloud computing service company (the supplier). However, the 
outcome of a data breach can affect the outsourced firm since the customers belong 
to the outsourced company instead of the cloud-service provider.
Another risk that is more concerned by the cloud supplier but might affect 
the outsourced company is local laws and regulations. Since data can be stored 
anywhere, the cloud service provider and its clients should pay attention to the 
laws and regulations where the data is stored and related trans-border laws [66]. 
For example, United States had no single principal data protection legislation [67]. 
Meanwhile, multiple laws and regulations are available at the federal and state 
levels. Therefore, the cloud service provider and the outsourced firm need to make 
sure nothing is crossing the line.
As for service automation, [59] found serval challenges exist when a company 
makes a decision to go service automation. They revealed that close to half of the 
manager found that it is difficult to retain existing process and system while adopt-
ing the service automation (47%), many of the managers discovered that the cost 
of technologies and expertise are expensive (40%), the managers unfamiliar with 
service automation and its mechanism (37%), lack of professions in Technology 
areas (35%), Technology is not yet mature (31%), and technologies have been 
oversold in the market (18%).
Overall, the challenges discovered from [59] indicated that the obstacles for the 
outsourced firm could cause by service automation is a newly developing technol-
ogy. This means that it will be expensive, knowledge and professions are scarce, 
and the majority of the population unable to understand it. Moreover, since it is a 
newly developing technology, it also indicated that this technology has many areas 
await perfection. Meanwhile, the cost of business structure optimization is a crucial 
concern above all the expense of bringing in the new technology. And of course, last 
but not least, the concern of robots replacing humans.
6.3.3 The risks
The risk section adopts the risk framework of [37] to discuss cloud  computing 
and service automation risks. The risks contain strategy risks, operational risks, 
intrinsic risks of atrophy, and intrinsic risks of location. Among them, strategy risks 
include agent problem, information leakage, and opportunistic renegotiation.
Firstly, there is the strategy risks-agent problem. Aron et al. [37] explained 
that the agent problem usually indicated that the supplier’s outcome did not meet 
the outsourced firm’s expectation and/or the outsourced firm’s lack of resources 
to identify an unqualified supplier. In other words, the outsourced firm felt that 
they did not get what they paid for. For computers and robots, it is hard to tell 
whether they “work hard enough.” However, based on the supplier’s performance,  




Choosing a qualified supplier can help the outsourced firm reduce the risk of 
information leakage in both the cloud computing and service automation areas. 
The qualified supplier should be the supplier who is qualified both morally and in 
capability. The capability indicates that the supplier can protect the data by using 
practical tools and algorithms at both the software and hardware level. The supplier 
should have the ability to protect the outsourced firm’s information both digitally 
and in-person from both outside of the company and the inside job.
In addition to capability, researchers found that the moral standard is an 
underestimated factor. Many papers did not consider discovering the moral of the 
supplier. However, recently, moral becomes more and more critical. Especially now, 
moral can be the factor that increases opportunity risk. To prevent the moral risk 
evolved into opportunity risk in opportunistic renegotiation, the authors suggest 
that an individual third party in either public sectors and/or private sectors con-
struct a standard or guideline to help service providers practice business morally in 
cloud-computing area and service automation area.
Secondly, there is the strategy risk-information leakage. This indicates that 
the risk of both cloud computing and service automation will rise continuously. 
Therefore, the demand for improving data protection is increasing. However, in ser-
vice automation, there is a dilemma for both the supplier and outsourced company. 
When the robot uses the black-box model to conduct a prediction and analysis, it 
significantly increases data security and privacy since no human can “look inside” 
to see how it works. This can provide the outsourced firm deniability on the out-
sourced service because they do not have access to the robot and the knowledge. 
All they get is the results.
However, the white-box model allows inspection from humans, but being able to 
inspect the robot’s working mechanism may also indicate that individuals can access 
the client’s confidential information. The supplier may violate the outsourced firm’s 
data privacy.
Winfield and Jirotka [68] conducted an in-depth discussion on a dilemma 
between the right of human privacy and for reducing the public harm created by 
the black-box model. They referenced the “black box” from flight data recorders 
and proposed an insight that the service provider should create an ethical black 
box inside the black-box model robots to record the sense data and the decisions. 
Meanwhile, they also suggest that robots develop moral values to fit human 
interests.
Thirdly, there is the strategy risks-opportunistic renegotiation. If one party 
completely controls the relationship, one will gain greater profits and/or voices.
With the trends of cloud solutions and big data Analytics, everything is heavily 
data related. Even the service automation (such as the cognitive insight and cogni-
tive engagement technology) requires users’ data to analyze, predict, and improve. 
Data become essential for profit. Hence, data protection has become the key to 
winning the competition in the marketplace.
An immoral cloud computing service supplier may get involved in the data 
breach and identity stolen in such a condition. However, the service automation 
outsourcing firm will experience the same harms as cloud computing service plus 
the company’s core strategy or the newly developed technology got duplicated 
or stolen.
Worst scenario, the supplier based on the customers and technologies the 
outsourced firm provided to optimized and develop an upgraded version of sub-
stitute product/service. The outsourced firm may be forced to pay to become the 
middleman between the supplier and the customers. The outsourced firm forced 
the founder to transfer to its distributor.
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The mechanism of this scenario is the same as when the firm in the 20th century 
determined automated the internal business process, due to the automation has 
evolved into too complicated. The firms began to have to outsource the process [69]. 
However, in this case, the outsourced firm did not force to outsource the business 
process. The firm was forced to outsource the core competence, which made them 
unique in the market.
Once the outsourced firm is caught in this predicament, it is difficult to leave 
this situation. The robots can optimize the product/service so rapidly that no 
human can follow, the outsourced firm became experienced the dilemma of either 
the firm become the distributor of the supplier company under the pressure of peer 
competition, or the entire company needs to experience a path shift in the core 
competencies.
To avoid this situation, the authors suggest focusing on agent problem and infor-
mation leakage to seek solutions. First of all, if the outsourced firm can find a mor-
ally qualified supplier, this situation can be eliminated. Of course, most of the time, 
the outsourced firm did not have the resource and information to avoid unqualified 
suppliers is the reason push the firm into this situation. That is why data protection 
capability comes along. When a supplier is qualified both morally and in capability, 
the supplier can design an encryption algorithm and safety code that only the client 
(the outsourced firm) can access the data and/or the results and services from a 
black-box model robot. In this way, even the supplier firm did not have access to 
the outsourced firm’s data and knowledge. Even when an error occurs, the firm can 
invite the government and the public to inspect the supplier firm to fix the issue.
Fourthly, there is the operational risks. Operational risk happens between the 
supplier and the outsourced firm when outsourcing is on-process. It usually is the 
risk of the communication and/or transmission systems between the supplier, and 
the outsourced firm is different. This risk exists at the beginning of the new out-
sourcing relationship for both cloud computing and service automation. The more 
the outsourced firm changed the supplier, the operational risks increase. If the firm 
changes its supplier every three years, the operational risk will higher than the firm 
changes its supplier every five years.
However, changing the supplier is more expensive for the first time change to 
cloud computing and service automation. When the firm first outsources cloud 
solutions and service automation, the firm needs to take risks and costs to digitize 
all the existing information. Also, service automation requires optimizing the 
business structure to fit for service automation. After that, when the outsourcing 
company shifted between the suppliers, they already had the foundation to work 
with cloud computing service and service automation. All they need to do now is to 
transmit the data and adjust the existing structure to fit the new supplier better.
Operational Risk and its cost now are turning into a common obstacle for the 
outsourcing firm executives who preferred the service automation technology. After 
all, nearly half of the executives in [59]‘s study found that the existing business 
structure is not compatible with service automation technology.
Fifthly, there is the intrinsic risks of atrophy. Due to now the cloud computing 
and service automation are still a newly developing technology, this risk exists when 
the firm decides to adopt cloud computing and service automation. This is one of 
the main issues discussed in [59]. The executives that adopted service automation 
technology disclosed that the service automation technology is so complicated that 
the professions are scarce and expensive. The executives have difficulty understand-
ing the technology.
For cloud computing, the challenge and the risk are similar. Maybe cloud 
computing will be a little user friendly than service automation when it comes to the 
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feeling of use. However, when it comes to data protection and maintenance profes-
sions, the outsourced firm will have to outsource all the services to the supplier 
firm who is storing the outsourcing firm’s data since the Encryption Algorithm, the 
hardware, and the software is all owned by the supplier.
Besides, there is the intrinsic risks of location. For both cloud computing and 
service automation, the main issue for this risk is where the location is that stores all 
the data. When data is transfer across states and even countries, the Intrinsic Risks 
of location increase.
Last but not least, there is one more challenge: the money issue. Davenport 
and Ronanki [59] showed that 40% of executives disclosed that the technology is 
too expensive. Meanwhile, an artificial intelligence project launched by the MD 
Anderson cancer center using IBM’s Watson cognitive system to diagnose and 
recommend treatment plans for certain forms of cancer got suspend due to the cost 
of the program is rising to $62 million in 2017. This example gives an example of 
how expensive service automation technology can be. The large corporations might 
be able to handle such a price, but it is hard for small and medium firms to access 
the benefits of service automation such as IBM’s cognitive system.
With this challenge, the authors of this chapter suggest the outsourcing firm 
with the same or similar interest construct an alliance to group all the outsourcing 
firms’ budgets. The alliance can determine the permissions of the technology based 
on agreement or contract for each type of alliance member. However, the alliance 
is the one sign the contract with the supplier and fund the supplier’s expensive new 
technology.
In recent decades, the supply–demand relationship in outsourcing is leaning 
toward buyer’s market. However, due to the advantages that computers and robots 
created, the outsourcing industry will fall back to the seller’s market.
7. Suggestions and recommendations
In this section we provide some suggestions and recommendations for research-
ers and practitioners.
Davenport and Ronanki [59] disclosed that only 22% of executives consider ser-
vice automation as the solution to cut off headcount. Even though the robot is great, 
but the errors are more invisible than the previous. Davenport and Ronanki [59] 
suggested that the reallocated employee can switch to a big data analyst. However, 
for the front-line employees, can the trial-and-error clerk be their next career 
opportunity? Amazon Echo’s example showed us that some of the errors might be 
detected only by humans. Does the outsourcing firm need the human agents to trial 
run and detect the possible robot issues before the product or service release to the 
public? Since the ultimate question is “will robots replace human labor or not?” this 
paper calls for future researchers to record and track the executive’s decision mak-
ing after the service automation outsourcing to reveal how the managers avoid the 
dismissal tide and relocate the existing employees.
Due to the dynamic, complex nature of its rapid development in the outsourcing 
industry, we feel the need to enhance the call for paper on longitude study. Based 
on the challenges section disclosed above, the tools and standardization of data 
protection are awaiting exploration and perfection. How to handle the balance 
between human privacy and artificial intelligence black-box model should bring 
more attention. We suggest that future researchers join the discussion and provide 
more suggestions and guidelines to help the industry construct such an issue.
We also call for a paper on the education field to discuss the future needs for 
human resources. Now, society is starting to use robots to help humans live better, 
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but it already showed the challenge of the public unfamiliar with the robots and 
their working mechanism. Are future talents need to improve such skills? Or is this 
the service supplier’s obligation to make robots more user-friendly? We call for 
more papers on the topic of cloud computing and service automation in outsourc-
ing. In addition, we call for more empirical studies to reveal the pros and cons of 
cloud computing and service automation. For the practitioner in the outsourcing 
industry, this paper recommends the executives consider constructing a network 
that allows all the buyers group their limited budgets to gain access to high-tech to 
help the business lower the cost and optimize the business. We also recommend that 
executives pay attention to the supplier’s moral value and construct a method to 
gain more control over the company’s core intangible assets.
The final recommendation requires researchers and practitioners’ cooperation. 
Lacity et al. [35] concerned about an undereducated outsourcing advisor can affect 
the expensive decision-making and can have a long-term influence for the compa-
nies. Meanwhile, Davenport and Ronanki [59] disclosed that some executives were 
unfamiliar with the service automation technology and its mechanism. In addition, 
Asatiani et al. [36] proposed that outsourcing is a complex and dynamic business 
strategy. With all these difficulties, we suggest that researchers and practitioners 
should team up together. Researchers help the practitioners to understand the out-
sourcing strategy and its related area professionally. Meanwhile, practitioners help 
researchers provide the research data and information to help academia understand 
the outsourcing topic better.
8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we briefly introduced the historical background of outsourcing, 
clarified the definition of outsourcing, discussed the motivation and risks of out-
sourcing, introduced the tools of risk management assessment. We also discussed 
the trends in outsourcing, focusing on the impact of cloud computing and service 
automation technology. Lastly, the chapter ends with recommendations for future 
researchers and practitioners in the outsourcing industry.
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